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THE SURFACE TRANSPORTATION SECTOR IN A
COMPETITIVE ERA: EFFICIENCY AND INNOVATION
IN PRICING AND OPERATIONS
DAIuus W. GASKINS,

JR.*

JAMES M. VOvTKO*
INTRODUCTION

The past four years have marked the most dramatic change in federal regu-

latory policies since the New Deal. Government controls over pricing and operations have been removed or substantially reduced in the crude oil, natural
gas, banking, communications, trucking, airline, and railroad industries. As
this roll call indicates, the transportation industries dominate the growing list
of those freed from federal economic regulation. The states have also begun to
curtail economic regulation, particularly in the transportation area. Florida,
for example, has completely deregulated trucking; other states, among them
California, New Jersey and Alaska, have sharply reduced their regulatory control over that industry.,
During the course of the debate over deregulation of the transportation industries, attention was often focused on various predictions concerning the
likely effects of these changes. The speculation continues even now that many
reforms are in place, but it has changed in a fundamental respect because
passage of the reforms has driven home the importance of planning for change
to the real actors in deregulation: the companies themselves.
There are two basic factors which will determine the outcome of the return
to competition in the surface transportation industries. The first is the shape of
the reforms themselves. Since the reform statutes do not totally deregulate these
industries, the residual provisions and implementation policies of the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) may have a significant effect on the outcome
of the move into an era of competition in these industries. 2 It may have different effects than the total elimination of regulation, as in the case of intrastate
trucking in Florida. Residual ICC regulation, however, will be significant only
in the short run. Governmental policy has been fundamentally redirected
*The authors are respectively Chairman and Director of the Office of the Chairman,
Interstate Commerce Commission. The views expressed here are their own and do not necessarily represent those of the Commission.
1. Hayward & Grindstaff, Internal Joint Memorandum, United States Department of
Transportation and Interstate Commerce Commission, October 16, 1980. Many other states,
including Texas, Maine, Michigan and Pennsylvania, are also considering removing or drastically reducing economic regulation of the trucking industry. Voters in Arizona recently
voted two to one in favor of eliminating trucking regulation over the next two years.
2. The statutes referred to are the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-196, 94
Stat. 793, the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-448, 94 Stat. 1895, and the Household
Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, 94 Stat. 2011.
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toward pro-competitive ends, and enhanced competition will subject business
3
decisions to the guiding influence of the marketplace.
The most important factor affecting the impact of deregulation is the reaction of the industries themselves to competition and greater operating flexibility. Whether transportation interests succeed or fail in the demanding free
marketplace, will depend on the decisions, skills and resources of individual
executives.
This article will outline some of the choices which transportation industry
executives will confront in the imminent competitive era. The discussion presents one view of the challenges which attend the rapid deregulation of transportation industries, and examines the policies individual firms may adopt to
meet those challenges. Appropriately, individual executives will provide the
answers to the questions this analysis raises as they bear the risks and rewards
of the marketplace.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CORPORATE DECISION MAKING

One of the fundamental changes precipitated by deregulation is the dramatic increase in the importance of corporate decisionmaking. Under restrictive regulation the operational and marketing decisions of individual companies was severely constrained. For example, it was futile to consider a major
alteration in the scope of the territory served if there was minimal chance of
securing ICC approval. There was little incentive to consider basic changes in
routings if one could not hope to receive ICC approval for abandoning unprofitable rail lines or altering trucking certificates mandating the use of
specific highways, one-way movements, or prohibiting service to intermediate
points. It was senseless to design new marketing strategies based on innovative
ratemaking schemes when both the industry rate bureaus and the ICC frowned
on any deviation from traditional uniform rates and ratesetting practices. Unfortunately, many companies never developed the ability to consider these
types of fundamental business decisions on an ongoing basis because they spent
their growing and maturing years under restrictive regulation that minimized
managerial discretion and made strategic planning irrelevant.
By restoring managerial discretion to the transportation industries, deregulation makes consideration of these basic decisions necessary. The accompanying stimulus of new competition, both actual and potential, requires executives
to reevaluate business alternatives and choose the correct ones in order to
survive. Having received substantial control over the territorial scope of their
service, each firm must now choose its market area based on operating costs and
characteristics, the service requirements of its current and future customers, the
level of competition expected, and its overall marketing strategy. Having received substantial freedom to set rates without governmental interference, individual firms must devise pricing strategies which meet the test of vigorous
competition.
3.

See Gaskins & Voytko, Managing the Transition to Competition, LAw & CoN-rEmp.
(detailed discussion of the effect of various types of regulatory reforms on the transition from regulation to competition).
PRoB. (forthcoming spring 1981)
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In short, the lifting of restrictive regulation has dramatically increased the
fundamental choices open to each firm. Due to the passage and successful
implementation of the various reforms, the corporate decisions of industry management have assumed much greater importance than the regulatory decisions
of the ICC.

One of several clear illustrations of this point is the reaction of the railroad
industry to the complete deregulation of fresh fruit and vegetable shipments.
The percentage of total fresh fruit and vegetable traffic carried by the rails had
declined so drastically, from 21 percent in 1975 to a mere 11 percent in 1978,
that it was not an obvious target market for new business development by individual railroads. 4 Nonetheless, the consultant studying industry reaction to
deregulation of this traffic concluded that the railroads, with some effort, could
have exploited this market by.aggressively marketing the innovative perishables
transportation programs they developed under traditional regulation.5 The
railroads, however, made no effort to attack this market until total deregulation
finally compelled rail management to act. 6
Once deregulated, they responded by developing a comprehensive program
specifically designed to exploit this market. They made deliberate choices regarding the specific level of service they were prepared to offer and the pricing
strategy they intended to follow. Significantly, the railroads that developed and
implemented these strategies were successful. The Santa Fe Railroad, for example, increased its fresh fruit and vegetable carriage by more than 78 percent
in just eight months.7
Another example is the extension of Blue Label air-motor express package
service to ten mid-western states by United Parcel Service (UPS) immediately
after deregulation of express air freight movement. Again, deregulation offered
carriers an opportunity to attack a market in practically any way they chose.
Anticipating this change, UPS decided to offer this specifically designed service
with a complementary pricing structure. The advance planning allowed them
to put the program in place the very day deregulation became effective.8

UPS has also developed an unusual strategy for reducing empty mileage.
Because there is a greater volume of parcels moving from the east to the west
coast, UPS trailers often returned eastbound empty. Management decided to
equip these trailers with refrigeration units and compete for eastbound fresh
fruit and vegetable traffic which has the opposite traffic imbalance.
Although this strategy is hardly revolutionary, one must recall that UPS is
an extraordinarily specialized carrier of small parcels. The deliberate shift to
4. Manalytics, Inc., Exempt Rail Transportation of Fresh Fruits and Vegetables: Initial
Impacts, ICC 80-M-1159, (March 1980) (hereafter cited as Manalytics Report).
5. Id. at 7.
6. The consultant's report repeatedly stressed the change in the psychological climate
brought about by deregulation of this traffic. See id. at 7-8, 88-90.
7. Office of Policy and Analysis, Section of Rail Policy, Interstate Commerce Commission.
For additional information on the resurgence of rail transportation of perishables, see Perishables: Hitting the Comeback Trail, RAILWAY AGE, April 28, 1980, at 22-28.
8. See UPS, Press Release (July 1, 1980). UPS Blue Label Air Service is unique in that it
offers low-quality air parcel service with guaranteed 2 day transit for less than 50% of the
cost of overnight service.
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perishables to fill an important gap in their system was a significant departure
from their routine operating patterns. Moreover, UPS had operated for years
only within the regulated freight sector. Its excursion into unregulated perishables transportation illustrates how innovativeness and flexibility can lead to
competitive advantage.
These are examples of the kinds of corporate decisions which have become
increasingly important under deregulation. Just as firms throughout the rest
of our economy continually make decisions on product and service options and
pricing strategies, successful transportation companies will begin to address
these choices as a routine part of doing business.
DECISIONMAKING WITHIN THE CORPORATION

During the era of regulation, much of the control over operations and pricing resided with regulatory authorities in Washington. Lawyers serving the
transportation company became extraordinarily important players in corporate
decisionmaking. This was only natural as the ICC, traditionally run and staffed
by lawyers, received information from the regulated industries primarily
through lawyers in the form of legal briefs and submissions. More importantly,
the deciding factor in a firm's proposed operating or pricing decision was
usually the Commission's determination of its lawfulness, rather than its potential as a business tactic or strategy.
As deregulation returns the responsibility for decision to transportation
companies themselves, the decisionmaking process of those companies will
likely undergo a concomitant revision. Removing regulatory restrictions eliminates or dramatically reduces the importance of legal components in these decisions. The wider range of business discretion increases the importance of
transportation managers, those personnel responsible for operations, pricing
and marketing, who devise and implement transportation service.
The case of fresh fruit and vegetables again provides a clear illustration of
this change. In taking advantage of the regulatory exemption, the railroads
devised a transportation program made up of three basic elements: improved
service, flexible rates, and aggressive marketing. This approach required a
coordinated effort by those divisions of the corporation whose previous activities had often been subordinated to regulatory requirements.
Improved service, a crucial element in the transportation of perishables, was
essential if railroads were to compete successfully with exempt trucking, long
the industry leader in perishables traffic. Success required careful and continuing
attention to routings and transit by the operations personnel. Improved transit
times were established and apparently have been a major factor in the resurgence of the railroads in the transportation of perishables. 9
Flexible pricing was also part of the railroad's successful entry into the
perishables market. When this traffic was deregulated pricing and marketing
groups, whose regulation era activities were largely confied to rubber stamping
9. For example, Southern Pacific reported a 30% improvement in turn around time for
refrigerated cars, effectively increasing the supply of these cars available to shippers by an
equal amount. Manalytics Report, supranote 4, at 87.
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collective action on rates, came to the forefront with innovative pricing schemes.
In order to compete with truck rates, two major rail carriers of perishables, the
Southern Pacific and the Santa Fe, established rates which fluctuated daily to
match the supply of rail cars to demand.10 This represented a startling departure from the ratemaking system utilized by the rail industry under restrictive regulation."
The exemption of perishables also spurred the marketing activities of the
railroads for agricultural products in general. The effort to redevelop this
market included the establishment of more frequent contacts with the perishables growers, special marketing units within the railroad for this traffic, and
communication systems giving shippers up-to-date information on rates. These
developments, along with the concomitant increase in the importance of marketing units within the railroads, have been an essential part of the coordinated
program implemented to compete with the rates and services offered by truckers.
The obvious lesson in the fresh fruit and vegetable experience is that successful exploitation of new business opportunities under deregulation requires
a deliberate and coordinated response. The need for this kind of response will
increase the importance of competent and imaginative participation by the
operations, pricing, and marketing arms of the firm. Already, at least two major
trucking companies have set up separate marketing and pricing departments
headed by personnel brought in from the recently deregulated air freight business.1 2 Trucking companies and railroads who simply rely on collective or
routine average rate increases to recoup escalating costs are unlikely to succeed
in a vigorously competitive environment. There is every reason to believe that
the advent of competition in surface transportation will strengthen a variety of
key departments outside the corporate general counsel's office.
STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR DEREGULATION

Clearly, the elimination of restrictive regulation greatly enlarges the number of business options available to surface transportation industry managers.
The decisions each firm makes in choosing among these options will determine
success or failure under vigorous competition.
Since the first significant reforms in surface transportation regulation were
introduced several years ago, firms have unveiled new business strategies and
tactics at an accelerating pace. Some examples of these innovations are outlined
below, with a discussion of their relation to specific reforms and their contribution to management objectives of operational efficiency and successful marketing. Although these tactics may be categorized according to the type of business
activity affected, for example pricing, it is important to emphasize at the outset
that successful business strategies most often involve a combination of coordinated tactics and changes. This coordination typified both the railroads'
10. See id. at 64-70.
11. The advent of flexible pricing in perishables traffic proved a boon to the railroads
during the truckers strike in the summer of 1979. With the temporary drop in competition
from truckers, the railroads not only gained additional traffic but were also able to raise rates
to ration the available supply of rail cars.

12. Ryder Truck Lines and Pacific Intermountain Express,
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experience with the fresh fruit and vegetable exemption and UPS' timely expansion of Blue Label air parcel service.
IncreasingPrice/Service Options
The success of UPS has shown that an inexpensive, highly reliable, but undifferentiated service can prove attractive to shippers. The success of this
strategy, however, depends on tight cost controls, a determination to fully exploit all economies of scale, and a large potential market. Of the nation's
approximately 950 general freight carriers, few are capable of duplicating this
strategy. Yet practically all of them continue to offer a similar undifferentiated
service to their customers. This has proved costly as over the past ten years
major shippers have abandoned for-hire common carriers in favor of specialized
contract carriers or private carriage. The common carriers now have an opportunity to regain this traffic, primarily by exploiting deregulation of the
type and variety of price and service options they may offer.
One example is the ability of common carriers to write customized service
contracts with individual shippers. 1 3 As recently as 1977, these so-called "dual
operations" were expressly prohibited. When faced with the loss of a particular
shipper's freight, a common carrier could offer a special rate. But the carrier
was prohibited from tailoring a specific rate and service package and contractually binding the shipper. The ability to contract is crucial because a
trucking company facing stiff competition would feel far more secure about
setting rates much closer to costs if it could rely on sole or preferred access to
the traffic.
A 1978 ICC ruling, later endorsed by Congress in the Motor Carrier Act of
1980,14 removed the prohibition against dual operations. Subsequently, at least
one major common carrier of general freight has contracted to provide general
freight service to a nationwide retail chain.-5 The shipper in this case, having a
high freight volume and widespread distribution requirements, resembles many
firms which have recently considered abandoning common carriage for contract or private fleet service.
There is a strong likelihood that other general freight common carriers will
take advantage of deregulation to engage in dual operations. It enables them
to depart from the undifferentiated service offering and retain freight volume
through expansion of price and service options. Dual operations also offers the
potential for reduced costs where some or all of the contract service can be
channeled through existing common carrier network operations.
Another area where the ability to offer an expanded range of price and
service options may prove important is the transportation of household goods.
In the past the ICC did not consistently support the few sporadic efforts by
household goods carriers to provide different levels of service at different rates.
13. These carriers must first acquire a contract carrier permit from the ICC. Passage of
the Motor Carrier Act has made this a relatively simple requirement. Motor Carrier Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, §10(a), 94 Stat. 793.
14. Id. §10(b).
15. McLean Trucking with K-Mart, Inc.
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Congress, however, in both the Motor Carrier Act and the Household Goods
Transportation Act, required the ICC to encourage these options. 16
At least one household goods carrier has already implemented an operation
offering three different price and service optionsY Experience in nearly every
other sector of the economy suggests that exposure to competition will lead to
widespread adoption of price and service options throughout the household
goods movers industry. It is not dear, however, whether it will be more efficient
from both operational and marketing perspectives for individual firms to offer
a range of options or to specialize in a single price and service combination.
The advantages and disadvantages of each strategy are relatively dear. A firm
which chooses to offer a range of options has a much broader potential market.
But such a firm may fail to establish a strong and differentiated corporate image
that is easily recognized by consumers. Furthermore, offering multiple levels of
service leads to higher average costs for each level. In contrast, a moving company which chooses to specialize, for example, in low cost, low quality service
could establish a dear market image and perhaps achieve lower operating
costs. But by specializing in one end of the price and service spectrum, the firm
automatically reduces the size of its potential market.
The increase in rail service contracts clearly illustrates the trend away from
undifferentiated transportation service offerings toward the development of
flexible, specialized price and service options. Over the past six months, railroads have filed 66 new contracts with the ICC. The terms of the individual
contracts vary enormously. Moreover, these new offerings differ radically from
the price and service packages offered by these same shippers under traditional
tariffs. s
EliminatingOperatingInefficiency: Routing
Restrictive regulation severely hindered surface transportation industry
efforts to develop efficient and cost-effective routing practices. Though employing different methods, both the Motor Carrier Act and the Rail Act removed
these restrictions. As these industries enter into an era of open competition,
they have the opportunity to minimize the costs of providing a given service
through revised routings.
The most comprehensive response is expected from the motor carriers, because routing regulation of that industry has been totally abolished. Nevertheless, the results of this shift toward more direct and less costly routings will
probably have a limited impact on profits. Lower fuel and labor costs will be
offset by improvements in average transit times, added competition from
carriers now able to compete because of their access to less costly routes, and
the resulting lower rates as competition forces companies to pass along the cost
reductions.
16. See Household Goods Transportation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, §§2, 4, 94 Stat.
2011; Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, §4, 94 Stat. 793.
17. Interstate Van Lines.
18. For a more detailed review of these first contracts, see Contract Advisory Service,
Interstate Commerce Commission, Summary of Initial Rail Contracts (July 17, 1980). See also
Malone, Contract Rates are Catching On, RALmwAY AGE, September 29, 1980, at 32-34.
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Railroad reaction to greater routing freedom is likely to differ greatly in
some respects. It will proceed in a more deliberate fashion due to: the physical
aspects of routing, i.e., the greater frequency of joint rather than single line
operation; the railroads' current lack of information on the relative efficiency
of alternative routings; and the method by which rail carriers must terminate
some routings if others are to be favored. At the same time, reexamination of
the relative efficiency of alternative rail routings may profoundly affect rate
levels. Railroads will then have a better understanding of the cost-efficiency of
particular traffic flows, and may, therefore, make the rate adjustments necessary
to cover costs.
The Rail Act gives railroads greater freedom to readjust joint agreements
on rates and routings with their interline partners. Already, the railroads are
taking steps that will eventually shift traffic toward the most efficient routings.
One railroad has developed a simple but effective means of identifying inefficient routes. By systematically analyzing the relationship of revenue and
mileage in each of its various traffic flows, it discovered that routing circuitry
was leading it to carry many carloads for which costs exceeded revenues by a
substantial margin.19 This unprecedented systematic examination has led not
only to a review of this railroad's single line traffic, but also to a fundamental
20
revision of its operational relationships with its interline partners.
Eliminating OperatingInefficiency:
Privatevs. ForHire Carriage
Those interested in the response of motor carriers to deregulation have
focused most of their attention on changes within the fore-hire sector of that
industry. This sector, however, represents less than one-half of the entire trucking industry. Private trucking operations constitute the largest single industry
segment based on gross carrier tonnage. Those who own and direct these private
fleets face an important descision following deregulation: whether to continue
operating their private fleets utilizing deregulation reforms to increase efficiency,
or to eliminate them and rely instead on the increasingly competitive for-hire
carriage industry.
Over the past decade shippers have steadily increased their reliance on
private fleets. Private fleets were not hampered by regulations restricting service
areas and routings, as were for-hire carriers. Until the advent of the trucking
reforms, however, these private fleets could only carry traffic generated by their
particular corporate progenitor. This restriction caused many private fleets to
run empty much of the time. Apparently, many shippers preferred even this

19. This preliminary analysis, conducted over the past two years by the Southern Railroad, suggests that revenue and cost relationship among carloads varies widely and includes
net losses in many instances. See Armstrong, Rate Structure Analysis: Plotting in Color Yields
Valuable Insights, RAILWAY AGE, May 26, 1980, at 45.
20. After years of dispute, the Southern and Conrail, its major interline partner for northsouth traffic, recently announced a new agreement covering routings and rates on certain
categories of interline traffic.
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grossly inefficient mode of operation to the fragmented service and excessive
21
rates of the regulated for-hire sector.
Now that private trucking operations have been deregulated, their shipper/
owners are presented with a dilemma. On the one hand, they could take advantage of the rights to haul the traffic of their wholly-owned subsidiaries for
pay and operate as general for-hire carriers, thus increasing the efficiency of
their existing private fleets. Conversely, they could abandon private carriage
and employ transportation specialists in the for-hire sector, which will be more
efficient and responsive in the post-regulation free market.22 Some shippers
with unique distribution requirements, especially those whose marketing
strategy emphasizes transportation, may well take the first course of action:
more efficient private carriage. Firms with extraordinarily balanced intercorporate traffic flows and tight control over fleet operations might do the
same. Many others, however, are likely to find vigorously competitive for-hire
transportation less expensive and less troublesome than private fleet management. Utilization of contract carriers offering specialized and individualized
shipping service is particularly advantageous. In the long run, trucking reforms
may lead to decreased shipper reliance on private carriage, as well as greater
efficiency in those private fleets which remain.
EliminatingOperatingInefficiency:
Tariffs, Insurance andHandling
Although UPS and general freight common carriers presently serve different
markets, a comparison of their operational differences is instructive. The operations of general freight common carriers typically exhibit the following
features: assumption of full liability for all freight tendered them, utilization
of an extremely complicated tariff system based on numerous factors including
the origin and destination of the freight, the type of commodity, and the weight,
density and value of the commodity and generally unsuccessful attempts to
introduce mechanized handling to reduce labor costs.
UPS employs dissimilar policies: strict limitation of liability for damaged
or lost freight; employment of an extremely simple tariff based primarily on
weight and distance, and successful introduction of mechanized handling to
perform the bulk of freight sorting. This comparison gives rise to consideration
of whether the UPS system is superior, and whether it is adaptable to the needs
of the general freight common carrier.
Initially, it is commonly recognized both within and outside the trucking
industry that UPS is an extraordinarily efficient carrier. The purpose of this
discussion is not to tout UPS' operations, but rather to suggest that trucking
deregulation provides traditional general freight carriers with the opportunity
to adopt some of their operational techniques. Several reasons for UPS' efficiency are obvious.
21. Cf. Office of Policy and Analysis, Interstate Commerce Commission, An Analysis of
Rates and Costs in the Motor Carrier Industry, (April 1980) (estimate of the cost of regulation in terms of excessive rate levels).
22. See, Phillips, Private Trucking: Low Profile Giant, DUNs REVIEw, October 1980, at
123-154 (extensive discussion of the issues facing corporations using private fleets).
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First, UPS uses a very simple tariff which ignores the type of freight
tendered. This dramatically reduces the labor needed to complete freight
transactions for both UPS and its users. In contrast, the commodity base class
rate system used by general freight carriers is extremely complicated. Small
errors may lead to huge differences in transportation charges. Both carriers
and shippers must employ large numbers of rate clerks to collect and verify the
voluminous data necessary to determine the applicable rate. This system also
impedes the use of modern, efficient electronic data processing techniques for
estimating and applying freight rates.
The UPS tariff system also provides a marketing advantage. Its simplicity
makes their service attractive to shippers of small parcels who are neither
trained nor experienced in arranging transportation. In addition the ease of
transaction tends to create goodwill.
The second economy in UPS' operations is its successful program for
mechanized handling and sorting. Their success in mechanizing is primarily
due to self-imposed restrictions on the size and weight of the individual
packages they accept. Their limited liability rate scheme is also an important
component of successful mechanization. It allows them to feed all parcels, regardless of contents, into massive sorting machines by minimizing losses if the
freight turns out to be too fragile for mechanical handling.
A third economy of the UPS operating system is the diminished need for
insurance coverage. UPS accepts only a limited amount of liability per shipment; accordingly, insurance requirements are reduced. A critical element
of the liability scheme is the use of released rates. Released rates are transportation charges which include a specific limitation on the liability assumed by the
carrier for loss or damage to the freight. A complicated tariff based on commodity characteristics is unnecessary if liability is strictly limited. When transportation is performed under released rates, the contents of the box, whether
diamonds or pebbles, is irrelevant to the carrier.
The Motor Carrier Act of 1980 gives all truckers the right to use released
rates. 23 Thus, general freight carriers can now dispense with complex, traditional class tariffs and substitute more simple released rates. They may eliminate the additional labor costs associated with complex tariff systems while
simultaneously reducing insurance costs. This would mark a major departure
from traditional operating methods and would necessitate an extensive marketing effort designed to explain the advantages of the system to shippers. Nevertheless, the UPS experience has shown that reduced rates made possible by such
modifications are quite attractive to shippers. The capacity to allocate risk
between shippers and carriers gives truckers yet another opportunity to tailor
service offerings to the demands of their customers.
REDUCING UNCERTAINTY

For a shipper, transportation is crucial to the successful marketing of his
product. Buyers want to know not only the product's characteristics and price,

23.

Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-296, §12, 94 Stat. 793.
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but also its availability. Regulation, however, needlessly impedes efforts to
reduce the shippers' uncertainty over transportation arrangements.
The surface transportation reforms are already correcting this unfortunate
situation. One example, previously noted, is the growth of contracts in both
rail and motor carriage. These contractual agreements reduce uncertainty over
future rate levels and also provide strong incentives for more dependable service. Many of the rail contracts filed with the ICC contain penalties for poor
performance (usually in pickup response and transit time). Some also contain
rate bonuses when the railroad consistently meets or exceeds these performance
goals.24
Several reforms contained in the Households Goods Transportation Act will
enable movers to offer service guarantees to consumers. Movers can now offer
consumers automatic payments for each day the carrier is late in delivering the
shipment. 25 One moving company has already filed a tariff providing for a
penalty of $100 per day.28 A second device through which movers provide consumers with greater certainty is the binding estimate.27 A binding estimate is a
contract which limits the maximum rate allowable for a given household move.
Although no mover has yet offered8 a binding estimate, several companies have
the program under consideration.2
ELIMINATING OPERATING INEFFICIENCY: LABOR AGREEMENTS

The advent of competition in the surface transportation industries will have
a profound influence on the future course of labor and management relations.
Similarly, the way in which both management and labor adapt to this changed

environment could have equally profound effects on the makeup of these industries.
There is little doubt that restrictive economic regulation has influenced
labor and management relations in the trucking and railroad industries. Entry
and rate regulations have molded the general economic and political environment in which past labor agreements were reached. In some instances, particularly in the case of the railroads, the federal government actually specified
details of these agreements. Many critics of regulation have attributed high
industry wages, a leading cause of inflated rates, to the abnormally high profits
of regulated trucking companies. Assuming that a significant portion of the
excess profits generated by protective regulation were passed on to organized
labor, the advent of competition strongly suggests some fundamental changes
in future wage levels.
Accordingly, the growth rate of union wage levels in the trucking industry
will have to conform to the average rates of return possible under competition.
To the extent that current wage levels were artifically inflated by protective
24. See note 18 and accompanying text, supra.
25. See Household Goods Movers Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, §4(b), 94 Stat. 2011.
26. Bekins Van Lines. See Taking Some Bumps Out of Moving Day, Bus. WEEK, October
20, 1980, at 45.
27. See Household Goods Movers Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-454, §4(a), 94 Stat. 2011.
28. Taking Some Bumps Out of Moving Day, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 20, 1980, at 45.
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regulation, the rate of increase in wages will actually lag behind the rate of
inflation for some period of time. If, however, wage demands cannot be reconciled with industry earnings under competition, the inevitable result will be a
substantial expansion of the non-union workforce.
The evidence to date suggests that wage levels for organized labor have been
falling as competition within the industry has increased. While the industry's
national labor agreement has not yet been renegotiated, renegotiations are becoming increasingly common at the local level.2 9 Concurrently, many trucking
companies that traditionally have conducted all their operations under either
the national or a local labor agreement are creating subsidiaries employing
non-union labor to handle specific types of service, particularly truck-load only
operations.3 0
The effect of increased competition on labor and management relations in
the rail industry will be equally dramatic. Deregulation poses labor problems for railroads which differ from those encountered by motor carriers.
The decline in rail activity over the past five decades led to labor agreements
which focused largely on job protection rather than dramatic increases in wage
levels. These job protection measures have foreclosed many opportunities to
improve labor productivity and have forced the railroads to cede many types
of contested traffic to motor carriers. 31
As a indirect result, the rail traffic base was narrowed to bulk commodities
such as coal and chemicals. These are the only areas where the railroads maintain a clear competitive advantage despite the failure of labor and management
to improve labor productivity. This narrowing of the rail traffic base has profound implications for the structure of the railroads, virtually dictating a much
smaller and more specialized industry. This prospect, if realized, would be
attributable to the failure of labor and management to reconcile permanent
job protection with the exigencies of a competitive surface transportation
market.
This outcome, however, is not inevitable. There are many indications that
labor agreements are being tailored to the realities of a competitive transportation marketplace. For instance, there has been a revival in the fortunes of
many shortline railroads which have managed to overturn the conventional
wisdom that only large, long-haul railroads can make money. In every case,
29. Representatives of the trucking industry and the Teamsters met but failed to agree to
renegotiate the national labor agreement. See Bus. WEEK, Sept. 8, 1980, at 110-112; Washington
Post, Sept. 11, 1980, §B, at 3, col. 4. Nevertheless, many local revisions of the national agreement have been reported, including straight wage reductions, elimination or postponement of
cost-of-living increases and less restrictive work rules. See Tamarkin, The Skidding Teamsters,
Foms, Oct. 27, 1980, at 33-34; Teamster Local Shuns Master Pact, J. Com., Sept. 30, 1980, at 2.
30. Office of Policy Analysis, Interstate Commerce Commission. See also Deregulation
Weakens the Teamsters' Clout, Bus. WEEK, July 28, 1980, at 80-81.
31. The productivity record of American railroads under regulation has been dismal. A
study comparing the experience of the American rail industry with the essentially dregulated
Canadian railroads showed dramatically higher productivity gains among the Canadian lines.
Caves, Christensen, & Swanson, Economic Performance in Regulated and Unregulated Environments: A Comparison of U.S. and Canadian Railroads (March 1980) (Social Systems
Research Institute, University of Wisconsin).
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they attribute a large measure of their success to reduced labor costs and in-

creased labor productivity. 32 This not only preserves rail operations and jobs,
it also promotes vigorous, intermodal competition and leads to more diverse
and flexible rail systems. The real question, however, is whether labor and
management throughout the bulk of the rail industry can resolve the conflict
between job protection and the pressing need for increased productivity in an
38
increasingly competitive environment.
SURFACE TRANSPORTATION UNDER COMPErTMON: A CONCLUSION

All of the innovative strategies and tactics outlined in this article are
changes already underway in the transportation industry. They are likely to
appear with increasing frequency as the level and intensity of competition inspired by deregulation increases. Some characteristics of those firms which will
survive the transition are relatively clear. They will be dynamic, responding
quickly to the changing needs of their customers. Competition will provide the
stimulus to act; the lifting of restrictive regulation will remove operational impediments. Price and service options will multiply and flourish. Operating
methods will be continually revised to promote efficiency. Labor agreements
will be modified to conform closely to the economic reality of intense competition.
There is certainly no guarantee that these modifications will lead -to a
properous future. Conducting business in a competitive environment is an inherently uncertain venture. Changes in technology and the demands of shippers
can make entire transportation modes obsolete. The era of competition, however, ensures that the rewards of the marketplace will be earned by those firms
whose services are most highly valued by shippers, and who provide these services most efficiently. Business success will no longer depend on the skill of the
attorney or the whim of the ICC. Whether surface transportation is dominated
by truckers or railroads, by big carriers or small carriers, or by contract or
common carriers is less important than that these industries have the freedom
and the incentives to provide the highest quality transportation service at the
best rates possible. The regulatory reforms in surface transportation over the
past year and the competitive environmenC they are creating will make this
vision a reality.
32. See, e.g., Kizzia, The Delmarva Shortlines: A New Breed, RAILWAY AGE, September 8,
1980, at 83-84; Holsendolph, How to Survive On the Rails, New York Times, Nov. 2, 1980,

§D (Business), at 18.
33. One example of at least a partially successful renegotiation of job protection rules is
the collection of separate agreements reached by individual railroads and organized labor on
minimum train crew sizes. See, Welty, Crew Consist: The New Pacts are Paying Off, RAILWAY
AGE, Mar. 31, 1980, at 48-50.
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